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Abstract
A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegn-
ing his commitment ("quasi-commitment"), is a necessary condition for anchoring
inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete
lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his com-
mitment ("optimal discretion"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics.
In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the
policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has
an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.
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Résumé:
Une crédibilité minimale de la banque centrale, avec une probabilité non-nulle
de ne pas revenir sur son engagement, est une condition nécessaire pour ancrer
les anticipations d’inflation et garantir le retour de l’inflation vers sa cible de long
terme. En revanche, l’absence complète de crédibilité, avec la certitude que la
banque centrale reviendra sur son engagement ("discrétion optimale"), implique
une bifurcation de la dynamique de l’inflation vers des trajectoires déflationnistes
ou hyper-inflationnistes. Dans l’exemple de la courbe de Phillips des nouveaux
Keynésiens, la politique optimale à très faible crédibilité impose une réponse de
l’instrument de politique monétaire aux écarts de l’inflation de signe opposé à la
politique de discrétion optimale, ce qui explique cette bifurcation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A key determinant of the efficiency of stabilization policy is the degree of the credibility
of policy makers, measured by their probability of not reneging their commitment or
the probability of a change of the head of the central bank. This paper shows that
the equilibrium in a model of optimal policy under quasi-commitment (Schaumburg and
Tambalotti [2007], Fujiwara, Kam and Sunakawa [2019]) is completely different from
the discretion equilibrium with no commitment and more relevant for policy makers,
even if the probability of non-reneging tends to zero (near-zero credibility). This latter
discretion equilibrium, however, is presented as a relevant benchmark equilibrium in
numerous papers since Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1999], for example in Gali [2015].
In the discretion equilibrium, each period-specific policy maker does a static optimiza-
tion ignoring expectations, whereas the monetary policy transmission mechanism includes
dynamics related to private sector expectations. Phillips, already in 1954, warned about
the dramatic errors of static optimization when the underlying transmission mechanism
is dynamic:
The time path of income, production and employment during the process
of adjustment is not revealed. It is quite possible that certain types of policy
may give rise to undesired fluctuations, or even cause a previously stable
system to become unstable, although the final equilibrium position as shown
by a static analysis appears to be quite satisfactory (Phillips [1954], p. 290).
In discretion, the policy maker’s rule, which is optimal for a static model, leads to
a sub-optimal positive feedback mechanism once expectations are taken into account.
It results in a locally unstable equilibrium in the space of inflation and of the cost-
push shock. Therefore, discretion equilibrium requires with an infinite precision the
knowledge of the parameters of the monetary policy transmission in order to force an
exact correlation between inflation and the cost-push shock. In practice, this perfect
knowledge never occurs, so that the probability to shift to inflation or deflation spirals is
equal to one in the discretion equilibrium.
When changing the policy from commitment or quasi-commitment to discretion the
qualitative properties of the dynamic system change dramatically. The probability of
reneging commitment serves as a bifurcation parameter, the bifurcation occurs when going
from probability zero to any probability, even infinitesimal small, larger than zero. With
quasi-commitment, the private sector’s expectations of inflation are taken into account in
the equilibrium, even with an extremely low probability of not reneging commitment. The
policy maker’s negative feedback rule is such that the policy instrument responds with
an opposite sign to inflation as in discretion equilibrium. This ensures the locally stable
dynamics of inflation. The inflation auto-correlation (or growth factor) parameter shifts
from above one (discretion) to below one (quasi-commitment). Shifting from discretion
equilibrium to quasi-commitment corresponds to a saddle-node bifurcation of inflation
dynamics.
However, the existing literature did not mention the bifurcation when shifting from
quasi-commitment to discretion equilibrium. Schaumburg and Tambalotti’s ([2007], p.304)
statement that "quasi-commitment converges to full commitment for [the probability of
reneging commitment tends to zero]" is valid. But their second statement that "it also
converges to discretion when [the probability of reneging commitment tends to one]" is
not valid, as demonstrated in this paper. Schaumburg and Tambalotti’s ([2007], figure
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4, p.318) numerical examples suggest that their second statement is likely to be false.
There is a gigantic gap between the initial jumps of inflation which is nearly the double
for discretion (4.9) as compared to optimal policy under quasi-commitment (2.5) for the
lowest numerical value of the probability of not reneging commitment that they have cho-
sen. Because of this large gap, Schaumburg and Tambalotti [2007] conclude that "most
of gains of commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility". We show that most
of the large gains of commitment accrue at extremely low levels of credibility. Finally,
the impulse response functions, welfare losses and initial anchors (or jumps) of inflation
are much larger with discretion than with near-zero credibility.
Section 2 presents Ramsey optimal policy under imperfect commitment and section
3 discretionary policy. Section 4 demonstrates the existence of a bifurcation and calcu-
lates policy rule parameters comparing near-zero credibility versus discretion. Section 5
compares initial anchors of inflation on the cost-push shock, impulse response functions
and welfare for near-zero credibility versus discretion. The last section concludes.
2 RAMSEY OPTIMAL POLICY UNDER QUASI-
COMMITMENT
Following Schaumburg and Tambalotti [2007], we assume that the mandate to minimize
the loss function is delegated to a sequence of policy makers (indexed by j, k,...) with
a commitment of random duration. The length of their tenure depends on a sequence
of exogenous independently and identically distributed Bernoulli signals {ηt}t≥0 with
Et [ηt]t≥0 = 1 − q, with 0 < q ≤ 1. The case q = 0 of discretionary policy is treated
separately in the next section. If ηt = 1, a new policy maker takes office at the beginning
of time t and is not committed to the policy of his/her predecessor. Otherwise, the in-
cumbent stays on. A higher probability of not reneging commitment q can be interpreted
as a higher credibility. This leads to use a "credibility adjusted" discount factor βq in
the policy maker’s optimal behavior. A policy maker with little credibility does not give
a large weight on future welfare losses.
At the start of his tenure, policy maker j solves the following problem, where sub-
script k corresponds to the new policy maker. Welfare is maximized subject to the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve with slope κ and subject to the auto-correlation ρ of a
cost-push shock ut and the constant variance σ
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u of its identically and independently
normally distributed disturbances ηu,t:
V jj (u0) = E0
t=+∞∑
t=0
(βq)t
[
−1
2
(
π2t +
κ
ε
x2t
)
+ β (1− q)V jk (ut)
]
(1)
s.t. πt = κxt + βqEtπt+1 + β (1− q)Etπkt+1 + ut (Lagrange multiplier γt+1)
ut = ρut−1 + ηu,t, ∀t ∈ N, u0 given, 0 < ρ < 1, ε > 1, 0 < β < 1,
where xt represents the welfare-relevant output gap, i.e. the deviation between (log)
output and its efficient level, πt the rate of inflation between periods t − 1 and t, β the
discount factor, and Et the expectation operator. The utility the central bank obtains
if next period’s objectives change is denoted V jk. Inflation expectations are an average
between two terms in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. The first term, with weight q is
the inflation that would prevail under the current regime upon which there is commitment.
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The second term with weight 1− q is the inflation that would be implemented under the
alternative regime, which is taken as given by the current central bank. The key change
with respect to the model without the possibility of a change of monetary policy is that
the narrow range of values for the discount factor around 0.99 for quarterly data (4%
discount rate) is much wider for the "credibility weighted discount factor" of the policy
maker: βq ∈ ]0, 0.99], with limit numerical value q = 10−7 > 0 in this paper.
The slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips is a decreasing function of the household’s
elasticity of substitution between each differentiated intermediate goods (ε > 1):
lim
ε→+∞
κ = 0 < κ =
(
σ +
ϕ+ αL
1− αL
)
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
(1− αL)
(1− αL + αLε)
< κmax = lim
ε→1+
κ (2)
with ε > 1, 0 < β, αL, θ < 1, σ > 0, ϕ > 0.
κmax = lim
ε→1+
κ =
(
σ +
ϕ+ αL
1− αL
)
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
(1− αL) .
Gali’s ([2015], chapter 3) calibration of structural parameters is as follows: The rep-
resentative household’s discount factor β = 0.99 for a logarithmic utility of consumption
σ = 1 and a unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ = 1. The household’s elasticity of
substitution between each differentiated intermediate goods ε = 6. The production func-
tion is Y = AtL
1−αL where Y is output, L is labor, At represents the level of technology.
The measure of decreasing returns to scale of labor is 0 < αL = 1/3 < 1. The proportion
of firms who do not reset their price each period 0 < θ = 2/3 < 1 which corresponds to
an average price duration of three quarters. For these parameters, the maximal value of
the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve when varying the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods, κmax = 0.34 is obtained when the elasticity of substitution
tends to one. The auto-correlation of the cost-push shock is ρ = 0.8.
If the policy maker is maximizing welfare (Gali [2015]), the cost of changing the policy
instrument xt is scaled by
κ
ε
which is a decreasing function of the household’s elasticity
of substitution between each differentiated intermediate goods (ε >1]:
0 <
κ
ε
=
(
σ +
ϕ+ αL
1− αL
)
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
(1− αL)
(1− αL + αLε)
1
ε
< κ (ε) < κmax.
With Gali’s [2015] parameters, the relative weight of the variance of the policy instru-
ment (output gap) is a very low proportion (κ
ε
= 2.125%) of the weight on the variance
of the policy target (inflation).
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to the policy instrument (output gap xt)
and to the policy target (inflation πt) yields the first order conditions for t = 1, 2, ...:
{
∂L
∂πt
= 0 : πt + γt+1 − γt = 0
∂L
∂xt
= 0 : κ
ε
xt − κγt+1 = 0
⇒
{
xt = xt−1 − επt
xt = εγt+1 = ε(γt − πt)
The central bank’s Euler equation ( ∂L
∂πt
= 0) links recursively the future or current value
of central bank’s policy instrument xt to its current or past value xt−1, because of the
central bank’s relative cost of changing her policy instrument is strictly positive αx =
κ
ε
> 0. This non-stationary Euler equation adds an unstable eigenvalue in the central
bank’s Hamiltonian system including three laws of motion of one forward-looking variable
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(inflation πt) and of two predetermined variables (ut, xt) or (ut, γt).
The transversality condition γ0 = 0 minimizes the loss function with respect to infla-
tion at the initial date:
γ0 = 0⇒ x−1 = −εγ0 = 0 so that π0 = −
1
ε
x0 or x0 = −επ0 .
It predetermines the policy instrument which allows to anchor the forward-looking
policy target (inflation). The inflation Euler equation corresponding to period 0 is not an
effective constraint for the central bank choosing its optimal plan in period 0. The former
commitment to the value of the policy instrument of the previous period x−1 is not an
effective constraint. The policy instrument is predetermined at the value zero x−1 = 0
at the period preceding the commitment. Combining the two first order conditions to
eliminate the Lagrange multipliers yields the optimal initial anchor of forward inflation
π0 on the predetermined policy instrument x0.
Chatelain and Ralf’s [2019] algorithm for Ramsey optimal policy with forcing variables
seeks a stable subspace of dimension two in a system of three equations including the
first order Euler condition on the policy instrument (or on the Lagrange multiplier on
inflation). The representation of the optimal policy rule depends on current private
sectors variables:
xt = Fππt + Fuut. (3)
This representation of the optimal policy rule is simpler than other observationally
equivalent alternatives proposed for example by Gali [2015] or by Schaumburg and Tam-
balotti [2007], where the policy instrument depends on its lagged value instead of infla-
tion. Chatelain and Ralf [2019] provide the details of the solution. The characteristic
polynomial of the Hamiltonian system is:
λ2 −
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)
λ+
1
βq
= 0.
Its solution inside the unit circle is denoted "inflation eigenvalue" λ (q, ε):
λ (q, ε) =
1
2


(
1 +
1
βq
+
εκ
βq
)
−
√(
1 +
1
βq
+
εκ
βq
)2
− 4
βq

 =
1
βq
− κ
βq
Fπ.
The optimal policy rule parameters are:
Fπ =
(
λ (q, ε)
1− λ (q, ε)
)
ε > 0 and Fu =
−1
1− βqρλ (q, ε)Fπ.
The initial value of the policy instrument x0 is anchored on the initial value of the
cost-push shock u0 because of the feedback policy rule. This implies an optimal initial
anchor of inflation π0 on the initial value of the cost-push shock u0:
x0 = Fππ0 + Fuu0
π0 = −1εx0
}
⇒
{
x0 = ε
−Fu
Fπ+ε
u0 = −ε λ(q,ε)1−βqρλ(q,ε)u0
π0 = − FuFπ+εu0 =
λ(q,ε)
1−βqρλ(q,ε)
u0.
The dynamical system in the space of target variables is locally stable with two eigen-
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values inside the unit circle: 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < λ (q, ε) < 1:
(
Et−1πt
ut
)
=
(
λ (q, ε) − 1
βq
− κ
βq
Fu
0 ρ
)t( λ(q,ε)
1−βqρλ(q,ε)
1
)
u0.
The positive correlation (κ > 0) between current inflation and current output gap
implies a negative correlation (− κ
βq
) between future inflation and current output gap.
The positive sign of the policy rule parameter (Fπ (q, ε) > 0) satisfies this necessary
condition in order to lean against inflation spirals:
0 < λ (q, ε) =
1
βq
− κ
βq
Fπ (q, ε) < 1 <
1
βq
⇒ − κ
βq
Fπ (q, ε) < 0.
The sign of the correlation of expected inflation with the policy instrument determines
the sign of the response of the policy instrument to the policy target in the optimal policy
rule. By contrast, in the accelerationist Phillips curve, Clarida, Gali and Gertler [2001]
mention that there is a positive sign of the correlation between expected inflation and
current output gap (− κ
βq
). If κ < 0, because negative feedback requires − κ
βq
Fπ < 0, the
sign of the optimal policy rule is negative (Fπ < 0).
3 DISCRETION
There is a long history of different definitions of "discretion" for stabilization policy
(Chatelain and Ralf [2020a]). Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1999] and Gali ([2015], chapter
5) define "discretion" (or discretion equilibrium) as the case where policy makers re-
optimize with certainty each period.
Proposition 1 When policy makers re-optimize each period (q = 0), they do static op-
timization each period even if the private sector’s transmission mechanism is dynamic.
Proof. If q = 0, the policy maker’s discounted loss function boils down to a static utility
((β.0)0 = 1, (β.0)t = 0, t = 1, 2, ...). The policy maker only values the current period, as
he knows he will be replaced next period, whatever the duration of the next period:
V jj (u0) = −E0
t=+∞∑
t=0
(βq)t
[
1
2
(
π2t +
κ
ε
x2t
)
+ β (1− q)V jk (ut)
]
= −1
2
(
π20 +
κ
ε
x20
)
.
The policy maker’s infinite horizon transversality condition is always satisfied as he does
not survive the current period and as his discount factor is zero after his single period of
life. Because the policy maker does not value the future, he does not take into account
private sector expectations in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. He only considers a
static Phillips curve with an exogenous intercept:
π0 = κx0 + β0E0π1 + β (1− 0)E0πk1 + u0 = κx0 + u0 + βE0πk=11 , u0 + βE0πk+1=11 given.
The superscript for the policy maker index k is now identical to the period index, as each
period corresponds to a new policy maker.
As expected inflation is not taken into account by successive policy makers, one order
(or one dimension) of the dynamics of inflation is removed in discretion. By contrast, for
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a non-zero probability of not reneging commitment, (q > 0), the policy maker takes into
account private sector expectations. This causes the bifurcation of the dynamic system
between discretion (q = 0) versus quasi-commitment (q ∈ ]0, 1]), see section 3.
Proposition 2 The policy makers’ static optimizations of an otherwise dynamic trans-
mission mechanism implies locally unstable dynamics of the dynamic transmission mech-
anism.
Proof. On an iso-utility curve, the derivative of the loss function is equal to zero:
dL = π0dπ0 +
κ
ε
x0dx0 = 0⇒
∂π0
∂x0
= −κ
ε
x0
π0
.
The policy maker’s first order condition is such that the iso-utility ellipse is tangent to
the slope of the static Phillips curve with a given intercept:
∂π0
∂x0
= κ = −κ
ε
x0
π0
⇒ x0 = −επ0.
This static optimization implies a proportional policy rule with the exact negative cor-
relation of the policy instrument (output gap) with the policy target (inflation). The
proportional parameter is the opposite of the household’s elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods. Any increase of current inflation is instantaneously related to a decrease
of current output. This static optimal program is repeatedly solved each period by each
new policy maker of period t:
xt = −επt for t = 0, 1, 2, ... with ε > 1. (4)
Substituting this policy rule in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, one has this recursive
unstable dynamics for inflation, denoted the discretionary inflation eigenvalue λ (0, ε) for
q = 0:
Etπ
t+1
t+1 =
(
1 + κε
β
)
πt −
1
β
ut with 1 <
1
β
< λ (0, ε) =
1 + κε
β
.
The policy maker lives only the current period. He sets a zero weight on future infla-
tion. For the policy maker, it does not matter what happens as long as it is not in his
instantaneous lifetime. The policy maker does not care in his loss function that his static
optimal policy leads to sub-optimal unstable dynamics in the future. The economy dy-
namic system is locally unstable with the inflation dynamics eigenvalue outside the unit
circle (λ (0, ε) > 1+κ
β
> 1) and the cost-push shock autoregressive root inside the unit
circle (0 < ρ < 1):
(
λ (0, ε) = 1
β
+ κ
β
ε − 1
β
0 ρ
)(
πt
ut
)
=
(
Etπ
t+1
t+1
ut+1
)
. (5)
The optimal policy for a static Phillips curve assuming a positive correlation between
current inflation and current output gap (κ > 0) but excluding inflation expectations,
leads to an optimal solution where the output gap responds negatively to inflation (Fπ =
−ε < 0). This example shows that the optimal solution of static optimization can be
different from the solution of dynamic optimization (Phillips [1954]).
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The policy makers’ sub-optimal static optimizations of a dynamic transmission mech-
anism implies locally unstable dynamics in the space of policy targets. Starting with
Hypothesis H1: Policy makers re-optimize every period, q = 0,
building epicycles on epicycles, four additional restrictions on private sector’s behavior
have to be imposed in order to restrict inflation dynamics to the stable subspace of
dimension one within the unstable space of dimension two. These four assumptions are
not explicitly spelled out in Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1999] and in Gali [2015]:
Hypothesis H2: The private sector expectation of inflation Etπ
k+1=1
1 does not depend
on current and past values of inflation.
Hypothesis H3: The private sector does not select paths with inflation or deflation
spirals.
Hypothesis H4: The policy instrument xt is a non-predetermined variable without a
given initial condition x0.
Hypothesis H5: Policy makers and the private sector measure with infinite preci-
sion the initial and the future values of variables and the structural parameters of the
transmission mechanism.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions Hi (i = 1, ..., 5), Blanchard and Kahn’s [1980] de-
terminacy condition forces a unique solution with an exact correlation of inflation and
output gap with the cost-push shock.
Proof. Blanchard and Kahn’s [1980] solution is given by the unique slope of the eigen-
vectors of the given stable eigenvalue 0 < ρ < 1 of the predetermined cost-push shock:
(
1
β
+ κ
β
ε − 1
β
0 ρ
)(
πt
ut
)
= ρ
(
πt
ut
)
⇒
(
1
β
+
κ
β
ε− ρ
)
πt =
1
β
ut.
There is an exact positive correlation between inflation and the cost-push shock:
πt =
(
1
1− βρ+ κε
)
ut. (6)
Combining this equation with the policy rule leads to an exact negative correlation be-
tween output gap xt and the cost-push shock ut:
xt = −ε
(
1
1− βρ+ κε
)
ut. (7)
The dynamics of inflation is locally unstable in the space (πt, ut) of dimension two.
However, inflation dynamics is constrained to vary in a stable subspace of dimension one,
which is lower than the dimension of the policy target and forcing variables dynamics. For
example, if ut is exogenous imported inflation, inflation πt would be exactly correlated
with imported inflation, without any relation to other drivers of inflation within the
country.
For practitioners of monetary policy, the assumption H5 of perfect measurement
stretches credulity to its limit, because of the measurement issues for inflation, for the
output gap, for the cost-push shock, for the slope κ (β, ε, αL, θ, σ, ϕ) of the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve (Mavroeidis et al. [2015]) and for the correlation of expected inflation with
current inflation (1/β). Because of these imperfect measurements, in the real world, the
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probability to select unstable paths with inflation and deflation spirals is equal to one
with the discretion policy rule.
4 BIFURCATION
4.1 Inflation Eigenvalue
Going from monetary policy with quasi commitment to discretionary policy results in a
fundamental change of the properties of the dynamical system.
Proposition 4 For any value of the elasticity of substitution between goods ε > 1:
(i) There is a saddle-node bifurcation on the inflation eigenvalue when shifting from
quasi-commitment (q ∈ ]0, 1] with stable eigenvalue 0 < λ (q, ε) < 1) to discretion (q = 0,
with unstable eigenvalue λ (0, ε) > 1):
0 < λmin < λ (q, ε) <
1
1 + κmax
< 1 <
1 + κmax
β
< λ (0, ε) <
1
β
+
1
β
κmax
αL
.
(ii) The optimal inflation persistence decreases with the policy maker’s credibility mea-
sured by the probability of not reneging commitment q ∈ ]0, 1]:
∂λ (q, ε)
∂q
< 0.
(iii) The inflation eigenvalue decreases (respectively increases) with the elasticity of
substitution ε for quasi-commitment (q ∈ ]0, 1]) (respectively for discretion (q = 0)):
∂λ (q, ε)
∂ε
< 0 <
∂λ (0, ε)
∂ε
=
κ
β
Proof. For (i), we first seek the limits of κ (ε) ε which is an increasing function of
ε ∈ ]1,+∞[,
lim
ε→1+
κ (ε) ε =
(
σ +
ϕ+ αL
1− αL
)
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
(1− αL) = κmax
lim
ε→+∞
κ (ε) ε =
(
σ +
ϕ+ αL
1− αL
)
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
(1− αL)
αL
=
κmax
αL
with 0 < αL < 1
⇒ κmax < κ (ε) ε <
κmax
αL
.
For discretion, the inflation eigenvalue is an increasing affine function of κε with bound-
aries:
1 <
1
β
<
1
β
+
1
β
κmax < λ (0, ε) =
1
β
+
1
β
κε <
1
β
+
1
β
κmax
αL
.
For quasi-commitment, λ (q, ε) is obtained solving a linear quadratic regulator model
so that the inflation eigenvalue is necessarily within the range ]0, 1[. It is a decreasing
function of βq, of q (according to (i)) of κε and of ε with this upper bound:
lim
q→0+
lim
ε→1+
λ (q, ε) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)
−
√
1
4
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)2
− 1
βq
=
1
1 + κmax
< 1
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which is true because:
lim
q→0+
1
2
(
1 +
1
βq
+
1
βq
κmax
)
−
√
1
4
(
1 +
1
βq
+
1
βq
κmax
)2
− 1
βq
=
1
1 + κmax
< 1
and because when q → 0+:
λ (q, ε) ∼ 1 + κ
2βq
(
1−
√
1− 4βq
(1 + κ)2
)
∼ 1 + κ
2βq
1
2
4βq
(1 + κ)2
=
1
1 + κ
.
Its lower bound is strictly positive:
lim
q→1−
lim
ε→+∞
λ (q, ε) = λmin =
1
2
(
1 +
1
β
+
1
β
κmax
αL
)
−
√
1
4
(
1 +
1
β
+
1
β
κmax
αL
)2
− 1
β
> 0.
For (ii), see appendix. For claim (iii):
sign
∂λ (q, ε)
∂ε
= sign
κ
βq
−
1
2
(
1 + 1
βq
+ εκ
βq
)(
κ
βq
)
√(
1 + 1
βq
+ εκ
βq
)2
− 4
βq
= sign
√(
1 +
1
βq
+
εκ
βq
)2
− 4
βq
−
(
1 +
1
βq
+
εκ
βq
)
= sign (−2λ (q, ε)) < 0
4.2 Rule parameter
The inflation rule parameter Fπ is an affine and decreasing function of the inflation
eigenvalue λ:
Fπ (q, ε) =
1
κ
− βq
κ
λ (q, ε) .
Proposition 5 For any value of the elasticity of substitution between goods ε > 1, the
inflation policy rule parameter Fπ (q, ε) is positive and increasing with the elasticity of
substitution for quasi-commitment (q ∈ ]0, 1]), whereas Fπ (0, ε) is negative, below −1
and decreasing with the elasticity of substitution Fπ (0, ε) for discretion:
−∞ < Fπ (0, ε) = −ε < −1 < 0 < Fπ (q, ε) =
λ (q, ε)
1− λ (q, ε)ε.
∂Fπ (0, ε)
∂ε
< 0 <
∂Fπ (q, ε)
∂ε
Proof. For quasi-commitment, the policy rule parameter of the response to inflation
is a decreasing function of credibility q and an increasing function of the elasticity of
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substitution ε. To prove that the policy rule is positive, it is sufficient to prove:
lim
q→1−
lim
ε→1+
1
κ
− βq
κ

1
2
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)
−
√
1
4
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)2
− 1
βq

 > 0.
When q = 1 and when ε→ 1+
Fπ (q, ε) >
1
κmax
− β
κmax

1
2
(
1 +
1
β
+
κmax
β
)
−
√
1
4
(
1 +
1
β
+
κmax
β
)2
− 1
β

 > 0.
In this case, one shows in the appendix that Fπ > 0 is equivalent to κmax + β > β which
is true because κmax > 0.
5 IMPULSERESPONSE FUNCTIONSANDWEL-
FARE
5.1 Initial anchor of inflation
To ensure stability after a cost-push shock, inflation has to jump to the stable manifold.
The size of this initial anchor depends on the elasticity of substitution between goods
and the credibility of the policy maker.
Proposition 6 For any value of the elasticity of substitution between goods ε > 1,
(i) The initial anchor (or jump) of inflation on the cost-push shock decreases with the
elasticity of substitution between goods for both quasi-commitment and discretion.
(ii) The initial jump of inflation is an increasing function of the limited credibility q
of the policy maker.
(iii) The initial anchor of near-zero credibility is always strictly smaller than the initial
anchor in the case of zero credibility:
π0 (q, ε) =
λ (q, ε)
1− βqρλ (q, ε)u0 ≤ π0 (0, ε) =
1
1− βρ+ κ (ε) εu0.
Proof. (i) It is straightforward to check that:
∂π0 (q, ε)
∂ε
< 0,
∂π0 (0, ε)
∂ε
< 0
For discretion, the anchor of inflation is a decreasing function of κ (ε) ε which is an
increasing function of ε. As κmax < κ (ε) ε <
κmax
αL
, the zero credibility initial anchor of
inflation (π0/u0) is bounded as follows:
0 <
1
1− βρ+ κmax
αL
<
1
1− βρ+ κε < limε→1
1
1− βρ+ κε =
1
1− βρ+ κmax
.
For limited credibility, the anchor of inflation is a decreasing function of κ (ε) ε which
is an increasing function of ε. As κmax < κε <
κmax
αL
, the non-zero credibility initial anchor
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of inflation (π0/u0) upper bound is:
lim
q→1−
lim
ε→1
λ
1− βqρλ = limq→1−limε→1
λ
1− βρλ > 1,
with:
lim
q→1−
lim
ε→1
λ (q, ε) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
β
+
κmax
β
)
−
√
1
4
(
1 +
1
β
+
κmax
β
)2
− 1
β
< 1.
(ii) It is straightforward to check that:
∂π0 (q, ε)
∂q
> 0 for q ∈ ]0, 1]
(iii) The initial anchor of near-zero credibility is always strictly smaller than the initial
anchor in the case of zero credibility. The gap tends to zero when the auto-correlation
of the forcing variable tends to zero and when the elasticity of substitution tends to one:
ρ→ 0 and ε→ 1.
lim
q→0+
λ (q, ε)
1− βqρλ (q, ε) = limq→0+λ (q, ε) ∼
1
1 + κ (ε)
<
1
1− βρ+ κ (ε) ε
For Gali’s [2015] calibration (ρ = 0.8), for any elasticity of substitution ε > 1 and for
any probability of not reneging commitment q ∈ ]0, 1], the zero credibility initial anchor
of inflation is much higher than the one with minimal credibility.
5.2 Impulse response functions
The values of the parameters are taken from Gali’s [2015] calibration: ρ = 0.8, β = 0.99,
ε = 6, κ = 0.1275 obtained with θ = 2/3, 1 − αL = 2/3, σ = 1 and ϕ = 1. Expected
impulse response functions are shown in figure 1 for four different degrees of credibility
q: 0 (discretion (Gali [2015]), 10−7 (near-zero credibility), 0.5 (limited credibility), 1
(commitment, Gali [2015]).
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
The parameters of the inflation dynamics change marginally between q = 1 and
q = 10−7. Inflation eigenvalue increases from λ = 0.43 to 0.57. Inflation sensitivity
with a lagged cost-push shock shifts from −0.13 to −0.08. Inflation initial anchor on a
cost-push shock shifts from 0.65 to 0.57.
By contrast, the shifts from near-zero credibility q = 10−7 to zero credibility q = 0
are large. Inflation eigenvalue increases from λ = 0.57 to 1.78 (multiplied by 3, crossing
the bifurcation value 1). Inflation sensitivity with a lagged cost-push shock shifts from
−0.08 to −1.01 (multiplied by 12). Inflation initial anchor on a cost-push shock shifts
from 0.57 to 1.03 (multiplied by 1.8).
The impulse response function of inflation of zero credibility is markedly above the
impulse response functions of inflation with limited credibility, including near-zero cred-
ibility.
To check the lack of robustness to misspecification of discretion, we compute two
impulse response functions facing a ±10% error of the initial anchor of inflation. For
quasi-commitment with near-zero credibility (q = 10−7), the error gap of 10% with respect
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to the perfect knowledge optimal path at the initial date is reduced to less than 1% after
eight quarters (figure 2). For discretion (q = 0), the error gap of 10% with respect to the
perfect knowledge optimal path at the initial date is increased to 110% after four quarters
due to inflation and deflation spirals in sharp contrast with near-zero credibilility q = 10−7
paths with ±10% initial error also represented on figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 HERE.
5.3 Welfare Losses
We denote the welfare of discretionary policy W (0). It is usually computed using house-
holds’ discount factor of β = 0.99 instead of policy maker’s discount factor βq = 0:
W (0) = −1
2
t=+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
π2t +
κ
ε
x2t
)
= −1
2
(
1 +
κ
ε
ε2
)( 1
1 + κε− βρ
)2 t=+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ρtu0
)2
W (0) = −1
2
1 + κε
(1 + κε− βρ)2
u20
1− βρ2 = −5.09.
In table 1, for comparison with the welfare of discretionary policy, the limited credi-
bility welfare is computed using households’ discount factor of β = 0.99 instead of policy
maker’s discount factor βq. We simulate the model over 200 periods in order to compute
welfare for different elasticities and different levels of credibility. One can also compute
welfare losses of Ramsey optimal policy solving a Riccati equation (Chatelain and Ralf
[2020b]).
Table 1: Welfare loss in percentage of welfare loss with infinite horizon commitment
(w(q) = W (q)
W (1)
− 1, β = 0.99) when varying the elasticity of substitution ε and credibility
q
- - - q = 1 0.8 0.5 0.1 10−7 0
ε κ (ε) κ(ε)
ε
W (1) w(q) w(q) w(q) w(q) w(q)
3193 0.00032 10−7 −2.119 2.8% 6.8% 10.8% 2.1% 73%
6 0.1275 0.02125 −2.688 3.2% 7.4% 10.9% 0.03% 89%
2.35 0.235 0.1 −3.489 3.6% 7.8% 10.2% 8.6% 111%
1.001 0.34 0.34 −7.971 4.1% 7.8% 7% 23.6% 141%
Because there is a wide gap between the large impulse response functions of zero-
credibility q = 0 with respect to near zero credibility q = 10−7, the welfare gap between
near-zero versus zero credibility is also gigantic: from 71% if ε = 3193 to 117% when ε
tends to one.
When considering only limited credibility cases, the losses with respect to infinite
horizon commitment are at most an increase of 24% of welfare losses in the limit case
of the elasticity of substitution tending to 1, (corresponding to a large relative weight
on output gap in the loss function of 0.34) for all the range of non-zero probabilities of
reneging commitment.
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6 CONCLUSION
When the probability to renege commitment tends to zero, the quasi-commitment equi-
librium is never the limit of the equilibrium under discretion where the probability to
renege commitment is exactly zero. The discretion equilibrium is obtained by static op-
timization of the policy maker of an otherwise dynamics transmission mechanism, which
implies inflation or deflation spirals as soon as the parameters of the economy are not
perfectly known.
FollowingOnce it is clear that the discretion equilibrium is not a relevant theory for
stabilization policy, the empirical issue is the measurement of the sign of the slope of the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve. If it turns out to be negative, the transmission mechanism
corresponds to an accelerationist Phillips curve instead of the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve. Unfortunately, for the U.S., nearly 50% of the estimates have a positive sign in a
large number of estimations done by Mavroeidis et al. [2014]. Once this sign is known,
the optimal response of the policy instrument to inflation will have the opposite sign
under quasi-commitment.
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7 APPENDIX
The new-Keynesian Phillips curve can be written as a function of the Lagrange multiplier
where κ > 0, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < q < 1:
Etπt+1 +
κε
βq
γt+1 =
1
βq
πt −
1
βq
ut −
1− q
q
Etπ
j
t+1
We keep the notation of Gali [2015] chapter 5 of the Lagrange multiplier with one
step ahead subscript γt+1.The Hamiltonian system is:


1 κε
βq
0
0 1 0
0 0 1




πt+1
γt+1
ut+1

 =


1
βq
0 −1
βq
−1 1 0
0 0 ρ




πt
γt
ut

+


−1−q
q
Etπ
j
t+1
0
0

 .
This leads to:


πt+1
γt+1
ut+1

 =


1
βq
+ κε
βq
−κε
βq
− 1
βq
−1 1 0
0 0 ρ




πt
γt
ut

+


−1−q
q
Etπ
j
t+1
0
0

 .
The characteristic polynomial of the upper square matrix of the Hamiltonian system
(with a determinant equal to 1
βq
) is:
λ2 −
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)
λ+
1
βq
= 0.
The Hamiltonian matrix has two stable roots ρ and λ and one unstable root 1
βqλ
:
λ =
1
2

1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
−
√(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)2
− 4
βq

 <
√
1
βq
<
1
βqλ
.
Policy rule parameter function of λ (ε) and ε:
(1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
= −κε
βq
=⇒
(
1− λ
βqλ
)(
βqλ− 1
κ
)
= − ε
βq
=⇒
Fπ =
1− βqλ
κ
=
(
λ
1− λ
)
ε.
The Hamiltonian system can be written as a function of the stable eigenvalue λ, after
eliminating ε:


πt+1
γt+1
ut+1

 =


λ+ 1
βqλ
− 1 1 + 1
βq
− λ− 1
βqλ
− 1
βq
−1 1 0
0 0 ρ




πt+1
γt+1
ut+1

 .
Proposition 7 Rule parameters Pu and Pz of the response of the Lagrange multiplier on
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inflation to exogenous variables:
γt = Pππt + Puut (8)
Pπ =
1
1− λ > 0, Pu =
1
1− λ
1
βq
ρ− 1
βqλ
=
1
1− λ
λ
βqλρ− 1 < 0. (9)
Proof. The solution stabilizes the state-costate vector for any initial value of inflation π0
and of the exogenous variables u0 in a stable subspace of dimension two within a space
of dimension three (πt, γt, ut) of the Hamiltonian system. We seek a characterization of
the Lagrange multiplier γt of the form:
γt = Pππt + Puut.
To deduce the control law associated with vector (Pπ, Pu), we substitute it into the
Hamiltonian system:


πt+1
Pππt+1 + Puut+1
ut+1


=



1
βq
− (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
(1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
− 1
βq
−1 1 0
0 0 ρ





πt
Pππt + Puut
ut

 .
We write the last two equations in this system separately:
Pππt+1 + Puut+1 = (Pπ − 1) πt + Puut
ut+1 = ρut.
It follows that:
πt+1 =
Pπ − 1
Pπ
πt +
(1− ρ)Pu
Pπ
ut.
The first equation is such that:
πt+1 =
[
1
βq
− (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)]
πt + (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
(Pππt + Puut)−
1
βq
ut.
Factorizing:
πt+1 =
[
1
βq
− (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
+ (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
Pπ
]
πt+
[
(1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
Pu −
1
βq
]
ut.
The method of undetermined coefficients implies for the first term:
Pπ − 1
Pπ
=
1
βq
+ (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
(Pπ − 1) ,
Pπ =
1
1− λ.
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For the second term:
(1− ρ)Pu
Pπ
= (1− λ)
(
1− 1
βqλ
)
Pu −
1
βq
⇒
1
βq
=
(
1− 1
βqλ
− 1 + ρ
)
(1− λ)Pu ⇒
Pu =
1
1− λ
1
βq
ρ− 1
βqλ
⇒ Pu
Pπ
=
1
βq
ρ− 1
βqλ
=
−λ
1− λβqρ.
Proposition 8 Optimal policy rule parameters are given by:
Fπ = ε (Pπ − 1) = λεPπ = ε
λ
1− λ =
1− βλ
κ
,
Fu = εPu = εPπ
λ
βλρ− 1 = ε
1
1− λ
λ
βλρ− 1 ,
Fu
Fπ
= A =
1
λ
Pu
Pπ
=
1
βλρ− 1 =
Pu
Pπ − 1
= −1 + βρPu
Pπ
.
Proof. The first order condition relates the Lagrange multiplier to the policy instrument:
xt = εγt+1 = ε(γt − πt)
xt = Fππt + Fuut = ε(γt − πt) = ε(Pππt + Puut − πt)⇒
Fπ = ε(Pπ − 1], Fu = εPu .
Furthermore, we can find the following lower bound for the policy rule parameter.
If 1− 1
2
(βq + 1 + κ) +
√
1
4
(βq)2
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κ
βq
)2
− βq > 0 ⇔
√
1
4
(1 + βq + κ)2 − βq > 1
2
(−1 + βq +
1
4
(1 + βq + κ)2 − βq > 1
4
(−1 + βq + κ)2
(1 + βq + κ)2 − (−1 + βq + κ)2 = 4 (κ+ βq) > 4βq
κ+ βq > βq which is true.
Proof of proposition 4 (ii): The larger the discount rate, the lower the discount
factor, the less we weight the present, the larger the speed of convergence, the lower the
inflation persistence eigenvalue, which is the root of the characteristic polynomial:
λ2 −
(
1 +
1
βq
+
κε
βq
)
λ+
1
βq
= 0.
λ2 − (1 + bP )λ+ P = 0.
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With our notations:
S > 1, b = 1 + κε > 1, P =
1
βq
≥ 1
∆ > 0⇔ (1 + bP )2 > 4P
Let’s prove that the inflation eigenvalue is an increasing function of the product of
the two roots, which is an inverse function of the discount factor βq. When proven true,
the inflation eigenvalue is a decreasing function of the discount factor βq.
sign {λ′ (P )} = sign



b− 2b (Pb+ 1)− 4
2
√
(Pb+ 1)2 − 4P



= sign
{√
(Pb+ 1)2 − 4P − (Pb+ 1) + 2
b
}
= sign
{√
(Pb+ 1)2 − 4P − (Pb+ 1) + 2
b
}
= sign
{
−2λ (P ) + 2
b
}
λ′ (P ) > 0⇔ bλ (P ) < 1 for b > 0 and λ (P ) > 0
We use the classic functional inequality:
√
1 + x < 1 +
1
2
x for x ≥ −1⇒
bλ = b
1 + bP
2
(
1−
√
1− 4P
(1 + bP )2
)
≤ b1 + bP
2
1
2
4P
(1 + bP )2
=
bP
bP + 1
< 1
QED.
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Figure 1: Impulse response function of inflation with q=1, 0.5,  10
-7
 and q=0 top curve. 
  
Figure 2: Impulse response of inflation: q=10
-7
 and out of equilibrium path +/- 10% error.  
 
Figure 3:  Impulse response of inflation: q=0 and out of equilibrium path +/- 10% error besides q=10
-7
 and out of 
equilibrium path +/- 10% error  
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